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1. Introduction 
 
Many studies find that corruption is detrimental to economic growth or investment.  
Mauro (1995) provides an early example but numerous others have followed.  Surveys of this 
literature can be found in Svenson (2005) and Asiedu and Freeman (2009).1  Researchers have 
also considered various channels as to how corruption could lower growth.  Murphy, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1991, 1993) argue that corruption reallocates resources from productive to 
rent-seeking activities.  Mo (2001) finds that corruption could lead to more political instability.2   
Empirical studies regress some economic outcome such as growth upon a corruption 
measure and various control variables.  A negative coefficient upon the corruption variable 
implies that corruption lowers growth.3  A policy implication follows that lowering corruption 
increases growth.  We do not necessarily dispute this inference, but we do argue that such an 
implication should be formally investigated.  Lowering corruption does not occur in a vacuum 
                                                             
1 However, this negative view is not uniform.  Others argue corruption can sometimes act as “speed up” money 
that can facilitate productive activities and “grease the wheels” (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; Aidt, 2003).   
2 Those that argue that corruption enhances economic growth also provide specific channels for how such a positive 
effect could occur.  For example, Egger and Winner (2005) and Barassi and Zhou (2012) find that corruption can 
help a host economy attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) thereby contributing to higher growth. 
3 Obviously, identifying causal effects from such associations is not trivial; but for the purposes of our discussion 
we assume that such causal inferences are valid.   
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and the anticorruption efforts taken by a government could themselves lower economic growth, 
at least in the short run.  For example, such efforts presumably require resources that have 
positive opportunity costs.  Becker and Stigler (1974) and Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) 
consider raising government salaries to deter corruption.  However, raising salaries for 
government officials reallocates government funds that could be used elsewhere.  Likewise, 
greater monitoring of government officials necessitates greater oversight and so more personnel.  
To the extent that lowering corruption changes regulatory agencies and governing institutions, 
then such changes could cause uncertainties that dissuade investment until these uncertainties are 
resolved.  Of course, if such costs are small then the dominant effect of anticorruption reforms 
would be to increase economic growth.  In this paper, we explicitly examine the effects of 
anticorruption efforts upon economic growth. 
More specifically, we examine anticorruption efforts in China from 2000 to 2014.  We 
focus upon China for four reasons.  One, it is a large country exhibiting regional variation that 
can be exploited for use in statistical comparisons.  Second, corruption within China has 
received much attention, not only in academia but also in more public forums.  Some even see 
substantial long run growth effects if it is not addressed.4  The ongoing anticorruption campaign 
under President Xi shows how serious the Chinese government views corruption.  Third, 
anecdotal accounts suggest substantive effects from anticorruption campaigns.  Two excerpts 
from the Washington Post provide examples: 
“As a result, many [government officials] are sitting on their hands, delaying decisions 
and failing to grant approvals for investment projects, either out of fear that they could be caught 
up in a future corruption probe or because, without a bribe, they simply lack any incentive to 
act.” 
“Graft has certainly not gone away, but the anti-corruption campaign has taken a toll on 
the sales of luxury goods and on business at high-end restaurants and hotels. Some karaoke bars, 
where officials were softened up with alcohol and women, have closed their doors; the former 
Portuguese enclave of Macao has been hit hard by a sharp decline in gambling revenue, the 
mainstay of its economy.”5 
  Finally, proxies for the intensity of anticorruption campaigns can be found at both the 
national and provincial levels.  We exploit the use of the official newspapers, such as the 
People’s Daily and its provincial counterparts, by the Communist Party of China (the Party, 
                                                             
4 Dong and Torgler (2010) find that corruption can have both positive and negative effects on economic 
development. They also find that corruption raises income inequality, lowers FDI, and reduces government spending 
on education and R&D.   
5 Denyer, S. (2015, February 11). Without corruption, some ask, can the Chinese economic system function? The 
Washington Post. Retrieved from: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/without-corruption-some-ask-can-the-chinese-communist-part
y-function/2015/02/10/c69693e8-b12f-11e4-bf39-5560f3918d4b_story.html. 
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hereafter) to communicate official government views and policies.  The People’s Daily (the PD, 
hereafter) is a national newspaper in China that many view as the official mouthpiece of the 
Party, similar to Pravda in the former Soviet Union.  Its provincial counterparts, such as the 
Beijing Daily, play similar roles at the regional level.  Using the Party’s official newspapers at 
the provincial level, we search for the key phrase “腐败” (“corruption”, in Chinese) in the China 
National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), the most comprehensive newspaper database within 
China.  From these papers, we count the number of corruption-related articles.  We argue that 
the newspaper count can be considered as a measure of the Party’s anticorruption efforts and 
resolve as the newspapers are the official voice, or organ, of the Party and are responsible for 
announcing official policies and policy changes, including those during anticorruption 
campaigns.  Our sample period starts from the year 2000 as that is when electronic versions of 
the majority of the province-level, official newspapers first become available in the CNKI 
database.  We discuss these newspapers and our methodology in much greater detail below.   
We then estimate the effect of anticorruption efforts upon economic growth using 
newspaper accounts as our proxy of these efforts.  We employ a panel dataset, using Chinese 
provinces as the cross-sectional units over the period between 2000 and 2014.  We employ both 
dynamic GMM estimation methodologies as well as an instrumental variables methodology 
since anticorruption effort could be endogenous.6  We find that anticorruption efforts lower 
economic growth.  Such a detrimental impact is further confirmed when we consider the impact 
of major anticorruption events in a control-treatment approach.  Specifically, we identify cases 
where high ranking government officials within a province were sentenced for undertaking 
corrupt activities.  We then examine to what extent provincial economic growth after sentencing 
differed from the norm and find that economic growth was lower for about two years.   
We, however, do not infer from our findings that governments should not fight corruption.  
Given the short sample period, we are most likely picking up short-run effects from the Party’s 
anticorruption efforts.  Due to transitional costs or uncertainties associated with anticorruption 
campaigns, short-run effects could be negative even if net long-run benefits are positive.  
Instead, we take from our results that diminishing corruption is not costless and our results help 
measure this cost, possibly providing governments more insight as to short-run costs of such 
campaigns.  Moreover, our results could explain why governments might not do more to reduce 
corruption.  If political considerations focus more on short-run outcomes then such costs could 
preclude beneficial reforms, especially in those cases where corruption is most prevalent.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses in detail our 
anticorruption proxy, including the validity of using sources such as the PD and its provincial 
counterparts to gauge the Party’s efforts.  Section 2 also compares our proxy with the 
                                                             
6 However, it is not clear how economic growth could affect such efforts.  Low growth could trigger more 
aggressive crackdowns since low growth could signal a more extensive problem.  On the other hand, low economic 
growth could lead to the Party to direct resources into other areas that it might feel could more quickly raise growth 
rates. 
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corruption indicator in the Worldwide Governance Indicators, that from Ramirez (2014) who 
uses U.S. newspapers to measure the level of corruption in China, and those that have used the 
conviction rate.  Section 3 presents baseline results on how anticorruption influences growth 
using a fixed-effects estimation.  Section 4 addresses endogeneity concerns because 
anticorruption campaigns could be driven by growth outcomes.  Section 5 undertakes an event 
study analysis that focuses upon the sentencing of provincial officials for corruption and whether 
such events affected growth.  Section 6 concludes the paper.    
 
2. Measurement of Anticorruption 
 
 Below we first discuss why we use the prevalence of corruption-related articles in official 
Chinese newspapers to gauge the Party’s anticorruption efforts.  We then show how to 
construct our specific proxies.  The third part of this section is devoted to comparing our 
proxies with related ones in the literature.   
2.1. The Official Newspapers and Their Functions in the Party’s Anticorruption Campaign 
 The Party established official newspapers, both at the national and provincial levels.  Like 
all newspapers, one purpose is to disseminate information.  However, others argue that these 
official papers go further in that they disseminate the official views and policies of the 
government.  Some have even claimed that such newspapers manipulate or indoctrinate the 
public (Edelstein and Liu, 1963; Liu, 1974; Lee, 1981). Probably the most well-known official 
newspaper is the PD, which has been affiliated with the Central Committee of the Party since 
established and directly controlled by the Propaganda Department of the committee (Wu, 1994). 
Similar to Pravda of the former Soviet Union, articles and especially editorials and 
commentaries appearing in the PD must be cleared by the Propaganda Department prior to 
publication (Wu, 1994; Shambaugh, 2007). In order to keep the nation’s media “on message”, 
the department sometimes “drafts the editorial in the first place” or “sets and enforces the exact 
wording to be used by journalists, scholars, and broadcasters in reporting on a given event” 
(Shambaugh, 2007). Of its three million subscribers, the vast majority are government agencies, 
state-owned enterprises, armed services, and other government-related organizations.  
Moreover, subscription is compulsory for these agencies (Huang, 2001).  The Party uses the PD 
to then communicate with these government agencies at various levels.  Consequently, the PD 
is widely accepted as the organ, or mouthpiece, of the Party and its articles are generally 
regarded as authoritative statements of policies and viewpoints of the Party (Wu, 1994; Luther 
and Zhou, 2005; Mao 2014).  
 As it relates to the anticorruption campaigns run by the Party, the PD can relay at least three 
types of information.  First, the PD directly publishes important decisions and announcements 
of the Party so that officials at various levels can access them.  For example, an article on 
February 10, 2015 covers the five aspects advanced by Premier Li Keqing that the central 
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government will focus on in the anticorruption campaign of the year. These aspects include 
removal of administrative approval for certain actions and investment restrictions, transparency 
of the government budget, etc. Another example comes from June 9, 2007 when the PD 
published an announcement of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the 
institution in charge of enforcing internal rules and regulations and combating corruption. 
Among other things, the announcement urged corrupt cadres to contact the CCDI voluntarily and 
confess within 30 days in order to receive lenient punishments.    
The second function of the PD is to report the achievements of the anticorruption 
campaigns. Some PD articles release statistics of the campaigns, such as the number of cases 
filed and investigated by the CCDI and the number of cadres accused of corruption. On January 
30, 2015, for instance, the PD published the work report of Wang Qishan, Secretary of the CCDI, 
which states that there were 53,000 cases investigated by the CCDI and 71,000 cadres caught in 
2014.  
The third function of the PD is to sway public opinion by setting the tone for the rest of 
news media, building a favorable consensus for government efforts, and addressing concerns 
about the campaigns. For instance, to demonstrate that the vast majority of cadres and the public 
support the campaign, a commentary published on January 15, 2015 cites a survey (but did not 
identify the source). The survey indicates that 91.5% of leading cadres and 75.8% of average 
citizens have confidence in the ongoing campaign. To address the concern that the campaign 
may hinder economic development, an article published on March 24, 2015 mentions that a place 
in Inner Mongolia called Hinggann created 18,000 jobs and increased physical investment by 
21.5% right after 42 corruption cases were investigated.    
For all of these functions, we take a greater prevalence of corruption-related articles or 
editorials to signal greater anticorruption efforts made by the Party.  Most concretely, this 
would occur when the PD is reporting upon the arrest and punishment of those engaged in 
corruption.  But even articles that merely highlight the existence of corruption do so in order to 
raise awareness and so can be a sign of greater government concern about it.  Presumably, 
increasing concerns about this problem then leads the Party to take additional steps to combat it, 
even if it is behind the scenes.   
Although to the best of our knowledge, no previous studies use the PD to measure 
anticorruption efforts, researchers have used the PD as a tool when studying government 
commitment to other issues.  Dong et al. (2008) examine AIDS coverage in the PD between 
1986 and 2002. They claim that the political nature of the coverage was largely related to 
government campaigns and focused on the government’s effort to control the disease.  Similarly, 
Liang and Lu (2013) use the PD to gauge the government’s anti-drug campaigns, including its 
drug education campaign in the 1990s.  Others examine the PD to ascertain official government 
positions on various matters.  Parsons and Xu (2001) compare the news framing choices of the 
PD with those of the New York Times in reporting the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Serbia 
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in 1999.  By conducting a day-by-day textual analysis of key words, they conclude that the PD 
reverted to more harsh, Cold War language just one day after the bombing.  The PD selected 
and emphasized the facts that were consistent with government sentiments. They also find 
multiple reports in the New York Times, accusing the Chinese government of using its vast 
propaganda machines, including the PD, to “whip up anti-American hysteria” after the bombing.  
Therefore, we are not the first to treat the PD as a gauge for the Party’s policies or positions on 
various issues.   
The PD is a national paper.  Each province in China has an analogous newspaper 
directly controlled by the Party’s provincial committee, the de facto highest political authority of 
its jurisdiction. For instance, Beijing Daily and Southern Daily are the official newspapers of the 
Party’s Beijing Municipal Committee and Guangdong Provincial Committee, respectively. 
Following the tone set by the PD, these province-level organs are responsible for pushing 
propaganda further down to lower levels of government. They focus on specific policies set by 
the provincial committees to meet the expectation of the Party’s central committee and cover the 
influences of the policies within the context of their respective jurisdictions.  As Shambaugh 
(2007) points out, the Party’s Propaganda Department closely oversees these provincial (and 
municipal) dailies, ensuring that official positions are followed.   
In this paper, we investigate the frequency of corruption-related articles in these 
provincial organs and develop a provincial-level panel data set across 31 provinces, autonomous 
regions, and directly-controlled municipalities in China between 2000 and 2014.  As will be 
elaborated in section 2.2 substantial cross-regional variation arises in the frequency of 
corruption-related articles in the provincial papers.  One reason for this variation could stem 
from different degrees of anticorruption efforts across the provinces. For example, the Central 
Leading Group for Inspection Work, a collaborative body led by the CCDI to conduct its 
disciplinary inspections nationwide, dispatched its first inspection teams to only five provinces 
immediately following the Party’s demonstration of its anticorruption resolution at the 18th 
National Congress.7  
2.2. Construction of Anticorruption Proxy 
We count the number of articles that contain the key phrase “腐败 (corruption, in 
Chinese)” in the official newspapers of the Party’s provincial committees.  The strategy can 
find the articles that are relevant to both corruption and anticorruption as the phrase “腐败” is a 
subset of the phrase “反腐败 (anticorruption, in Chinese)”.  Note that as discussed above, the 
appearance of such articles, including those containing the phrase “腐败” but not “反腐败”, is 
not merely to inform the public of the presence of corruption.  The party is choosing to make 
                                                             
7 The five provinces were Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Hubei, Chongqing, and Guizhou. Source: the People’s Daily, 
January 9, 2014.  
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some event public knowledge for a wider purpose.  We normalize the number of 
corruption-related articles in two ways.  The first is to divide the number of corruption related 
articles by the total number of articles.  As an alternative, we also normalize by the number of 
articles that contain the phrase “政府 (government, in Chinese)”.  Not only can the second 
measure be used as a robustness check but it provides a more similar comparison since 
corruption involves government officials.  Both ways, however, help to normalize the 
corruption article count by accounting for changes in the size of newspapers and/or any shift of 
the Party’s general publicizing strategy over the years.8 We use the historical newspaper search 
engine of China Core Newspapers Full-text Database, which is part of the China National 
Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), the most comprehensive databases of academic journals, 
newspapers, dissertations, and proceedings published in Chinese. According to the 
self-description on its website, the CNKI collects 13 million articles from 604 newspapers in 
China which start from the year 2000 to the present. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 
Figure 1 shows the medians (across provinces) of the two proxies between 2000 and 2014. 
Both suggest at least two major anticorruption campaigns run by the Party in the past 15 years.9  
The occurrence of the campaigns also coincides with transitions in Party leadership. The first 
took place in 2001 under the leadership of President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji.  
Corruption-related articles measured 3.7% of all articles and 11.2% of the articles containing the 
word “government” in the official newspapers. That campaign started with the investigation of 
Cheng Kejie’s corruption scandal in 2000. Cheng had been Vice Chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress and considered as one of the national leaders of 
the Party before he was sentenced to death for a bribe of RMB 40 million.10 The campaign went 
deeper and broader with the exposure of the Yuan-Hua Group smuggling scandal totaling RMB 
53 billion of foreign products, ranging from cars to crude oil to cigarettes. Nearly 300 people 
were convicted and many of them were high-ranking government officials, such as the Deputy 
Minister of Public Security of China and the Vice Secretary of the Provincial Committee of the 
                                                             
8 As an example of the change in size, the PD expanded from 12 pages to 16 in 2003 and again to 20 pages in 2009. 
As to the shift of the Party’s publicizing strategy, Huang (2001) finds that many official newspapers redefined 
themselves as half propaganda-oriented and half market-oriented in the late 1990s to be able to compete with 
commercialized local newspapers in the market.  
9 We also depict evolution of the anticorruption campaigns with the provincial means of the two proxies. In addition, 
we apply the same counting strategy to the articles in the PD, which allows us to identify changes at the national 
level in an alternative way. No matter which proxy we use, we find the highest frequencies of corruption-related 
articles occurring in the early 2000s and in the last two years of the sample, respectively.   
10 The People's Daily. 31 July 2000. 
9 
 
Party. In the midst of the campaign, in order to show his resolution to combat corruption, 
Premier Zhu once said to the press that he had 100 coffins prepared, 99 for the corrupt and 1 for 
himself. The campaign came to an end in 2003 when both President Jiang and Premier Zhu 
stepped down.   
Both proxies then declined and remained low from 2003 to 2011.  The lowest levels of 
both proxies occur in 2010 with only 1.6% of all articles and 4.3% of government-related articles.  
This suggests that the Party did not run any massive anticorruption campaign during the 
administration of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao though the routine investigation 
of corruption still occurred.  Both proxies start to increase again in 2012, partially because Bo 
Xilai’s corruption scandal was exposed. Bo had served as a member of the Party’s Central 
Politburo before he was sentenced to life imprisonment due to corruption and other criminal 
charges.  Most provincial organs of the Party published at least two editorials in April 2012 
when Bo was suspended from the politburo.  These editorials directly commented on Bo’s case 
and showed the provincial committees’ loyalty and support for the Central Committee’s 
decision.11  
On the far right of the figure, both proxies effectively capture the ongoing anticorruption 
campaign.  In December 2012, the Party held its 18th National Congress in Beijing and the 
incumbent leadership was elected, centered on President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang.   
The leadership put forward its administrative goals and programs at the 3rd Plenary Session of 
the 18th Central Committee of the Party in November 2013, which included a massive scale of 
political and economic reforms.  Among them, what has proved to be a crucial element since 
then is to make special effort to crack down on corruption.  According to the statistics released 
on the web site of the CCDI, it undertook 53,085 corruption investigations and disciplined 
71,748 government officials since then.12  Among them, three are national leaders of the Party, 
including Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee.  Zhou is the 
most senior figure to face corruption charges in the history of the Party.13  That is why the 
median shares of corruption-related articles climb up to 4.9% (relative to all articles) and 11.1% 
(to government-related articles), respectively, in 2014.  Looking at the entire sample period, we 
think our proxies mimic variations in the Party’s anticorruption efforts with reasonable accuracy.  
Our proxies also contain large variation across provinces.  There are several remarkable 
phenomena displayed in Figure 2. First, these proxies are largest in magnitude in the central 
                                                             
11 In fact, Bo’s scandal was exposed accidentally when one of his disciples sought asylum at an American consulate 
in China and revealed details of Bo and his family’s crimes. However, the Party had made special efforts to remove 
him from the politburo as his political allies tried to avoid all this from happening. 
12 Source: http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yw/201501/t20150107_49817.html. 
13 Zhou was charged with bribery, abuse of power, and the intentional disclosure of state secrets in April, 2015. 
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provinces, including Shanxi, Henan, Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi.14  The proxies are relatively 
lower in all border regions except for Jilin and Tibet. One possible explanation is that more 
emphasis is placed upon border security in these regions when prioritizing policies.  Attempts 
to combat corruption in border areas could cause shakeups that destabilize these regions.   
Second, our proxies are also lower in provinces with relatively larger shares of ethnic 
minorities.  These provinces include four of the five autonomous regions, Guangxi, Lingxia, 
Xinjiang, and Inner Monoglia, and even those with a substantial amount of ethnic-minority 
inhabitants, such as Qinghai, Yunnan and Sichuan.  As with border security, the Party probably 
places ethnic concerns before anticorruption efforts since ethnic tensions remain a large concern 
of the government.  Anticorruption campaigns could stir up anti-government sentiment in these 
areas.     
 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 
Third, our proxies do not seem strongly correlated with the level of economic 
development.  One might argue that the Party should fight corruption harder in the coastal areas 
whose market is more prosperous than that of inland areas and so government officials are more 
likely to be exposed to bribery.  This, however, is inconsistent with what Figure 2 shows.  
Many coastal areas such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Shanghai see lower frequencies of 
corruption-related articles in the official newspapers.  On the contrary, one could argue that the 
Party should focus its anticorruption efforts in inland areas whose cadres are likely to be more 
corrupt because the market is less open and more influenced by the government.  However, this 
is not consistent with what Figure 2 indicates, either.  
Lastly, the frequencies of corruption-related articles in the official newspapers seem to 
depend partially upon provincial leaders of the Party.  There is more coverage of corruption in 
the official newspapers when provincial leaders of the Party get caught due to corruption or they 
are ardent supporters of the anticorruption campaign run by the Central Committee of the Party.  
Take Guangdong as an example as it has the highest mean frequency of corruption-related 
articles to all articles, stemming from the 2009-12 window.  During this time, Wang Yang 
served as the provincial committee secretary of the Party who was known as an anticorruption 
advocate.15  Shanxi, as another example, is the province where our second proxy indicates that 
anticorruption campaigns are most intense.  The mean share of corruption-related articles to 
government-related ones is 8.8%.  In the meanwhile, it also has the highest standard deviation, 
                                                             
14 In addition, four other central provinces, Hebei, Shaanxi, Anhui, and Chongqing, also hold a place in the group 
with the second-highest frequency of corruption-related articles.  
15 Wang is currently one of the four Vice Premiers of China and a member of the politburo of the Party.  
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4.3%, implying large variation over time.  Its high mean stems from its large share of 
corruption articles (relative to government-related ones) in 2014, 22.5%.  Behind the number is 
the corruption scandal of a national leader of the Party, Ling Jihua, whose family and supporters 
were deeply rooted in Shanxi.16  Hence, the Party’s anticorruption efforts are more or less 
associated with the characteristics of high-rank government officials in a province. 
In summary, our proxies show great variation over time and across provinces, allowing 
for econometric methodologies of panel data.  Moreover, our proxies are not largest or smallest 
in the highest income provinces, suggesting that they are not driven by income but could be 
exogenous to the stage of economic development.   
2.3. Comparing Our Proxies to Others 
If one believes that the Party’s anticorruption efforts are purely the responses to how 
corrupt a province is, it is possible that our newspaper proxies are not much different from the 
measures of corruption in the literature.  To further address such a concern (although we have 
discussed above a variety of political considerations in the Party’s decision-making process 
during its anticorruption campaigns) we compare our proxies to three popular ones of corruption 
in the literature.  Given the similarities of our two proxies displayed in the previous part, we 
focus discussion on the ratio of corruption-related articles to all articles.  Using the other proxy 
where we normalize with respect to government articles gives similar comparisons.       
 Figure 3 compares our main proxy (at the national level) to the commonly used measure of 
corruption from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) called Control of Corruption.  The 
coefficient of variation (CV) is 32% for our proxy but only 6% for the WGI measure.  The WGI 
measure remains steady throughout the sample period with little evidence of either a nonzero 
trend or large fluctuations, suggesting that – at least at the national level – corruption has 
changed little across the sample period.  Our anticorruption proxy, in contrast, shows much 
greater variation, which is not surprising given that anticorruption policies are presumably more 
malleable than is the level of corruption.  Use of the Corruption Perceptions Index from 
Transparency International gives a similar picture.          
 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
 
                                                             
16 Between 2012 and 2014, Ling served as Vice Chairman of the National Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) and the head of the United Front Work Department of the Party’s Central Committee. He was 
removed from both positions in late 2014 and early 2015, respectively, though his case is still under investigation of 
the CCDI. His brother, Ling Zhengce, who was one of the Party’s provincial leaders and used to be the 
Vice-Chairman of Shanxi People's Political Consultative Conference is now under investigation of the CCDI as 
well. 
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A second measure comes from newspapers although to the best of our knowledge only 
two studies use newspaper count data as a proxy for corruption.  Glaeser and Goldin (2006) 
count the articles in the New York Times and other newspapers from 1810 to 1975 that contain 
the words “corruption” or “fraud”.  They claim that given the absence of other measures of 
corruption during the period, the count effectively gauges media coverage of corruption and 
offers a proxy for the amount of reported corruption.  They find that the trend of the count is 
consistent with political cycles and well-known corruption scandals in U.S. history.  
Following this direction, Ramirez (2014) compares the corruption situation in China 
between 1990 and 2011 with that in the U.S. between 1870 and 1930 (as their income levels 
were similar) by tracking corruption-related articles in prominent U.S. newspapers.  Despite the 
similarity of the newspaper-counting strategy between Ramirez and ourselves, important 
differences remain.  Ramirez (2014) examines U.S. newspapers whereas we use official 
newspapers of the Party.  Although some of the articles in the U.S. papers discuss government 
efforts to battle corruption, others could focus more on a descriptive analysis of corruption in 
China without necessarily indicating any government action towards it.  On the other hand, we 
take any description of corruption within the PD or its provincial counterparts as an indication of 
government efforts to reduce it since the very inclusion of a corruption article within the official 
newspapers provides a signal of the Party’s displeasure of it.   
Moreover, Ramirez’s proxies could also capture greater general interest of China among 
U.S. readers thereby increasing all types of articles on China, both positive and negative ones.  
However, a higher frequency of corruption-related articles in the official newspapers should only 
be interpreted as a sign that the Party is combatting corruption more intensely.  Another crucial 
difference is that we can construct analogous measures at the provincial level allowing for 
statistical analysis across Chinese provinces whereas Ramirez’s measure only tracks variations 
over time at the national level.   
Obviously, our measures provide some overlap, but correlations are not that high.  
Comparing two measures that are most comparable – our proxy normalized by 
government-related articles and his proxy normalized by politically-related articles – gives a 
correlation of only 0.30.  Therefore, these two indices certainly capture distinct aspects of 
corruption within China.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
 
Figure 4 compares two of these measures: the Ramirez proxy, the ratio of the number of 
corruption-related articles to that of political ones in the U.S. newspapers, and our second 
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proxy.17  Note that the Romirez proxy fluctuates below 2%, as shown by the left axis, whereas 
our proxy spikes above 11% in some years, as shown by the right axis.  Such difference is 
reasonable as U.S. newspapers cover news from all over the world, especially U.S. domestic 
stories, thereby limiting coverage of corruption within China.  Nevertheless, one can still 
compare differences.  Both measures are increasing after 2010 and show a high degree of 
co-movement and so both could capture the anticorruption campaigns from 2012 to the present.18  
Other periods, however, see different patterns.  The Ramirez measure becomes flat in the 
middle of the graph whereas ours shows a steady decrease.  His steadily declines at the 
beginning of the sample period but ours spikes in 2001.  This spike corresponds to the 
anticorruption campaign discussed in section 2.1, a campaign that does not seem to influence the 
Ramirez measure.  
Finally, we compare our proxy to another measure that has been widely employed as a 
corruption measure.  Goel and Nelson (1998), Fisman and Gatti (2002), and Glaeser and Saks 
(2006) use the rate of convictions to measure corruption across U.S. states.  Dong and Torgler 
(2012, 2013) apply similar techniques to Chinese provinces using the number of corruption cases 
filed by the People’s Procuratorate in a province.19  Figure 5 displays the correlation between 
the conviction rate of Chinese provinces and our main proxy.20  The rate is positively correlated 
with our proxy, suggesting that the conviction rate tends to be higher in the provinces where the 
Party combats corruption more intensely.  It is then arguable that convictions capture not only 
the prevalence of corruption but also the effort of a government to prosecute such malfeasance.21  
However, the correlation coefficient between the two is merely 0.22.  
                                                             
17 Ramirez (2014)’s sample period is 1990 to 2011. We follow his searching strategy and extend the period to the 
year of 2014 so as to cover the ongoing anticorruption campaign run by the current leadership. The search engine is 
Factiva and we restrict the search to the same US newspapers: Atlanta Journal Constitution, Chicago Tribune, Los 
Angeles Times, New York Times, and Washington Post. 
18 It is hard to argue that China has become 2.44 times more corrupt from 2010 (0.69%) to 2014 (1.69%), as 
suggested by the Ramirez proxy. There could be two driving forces behind such a change. First, more China-related 
articles appear in the U.S. newspapers due to greater interest of China among U.S. readers. Second, the U.S. 
newspapers cover more frequently anticorruption actions taken by Chinese government because relevant stories tend 
to be more interesting and controversial. The evidence, therefore, indicates that the Ramirez proxy does capture both 
anticorruption and corruption.  
19 Since the vast majority of cases filed by the People’s Procuratorate result in convictions in China, the number of 
cases filed provides a good measure of the number of convictions.   
20 The correlation analysis between the conviction rate and our other proxy, the ratio of corruption-related articles to 
government-related articles, is 0.33.     
21 In fact, Cole et al. (2008) use this same measure to gauge the extent of a government’s anti-corruption effort 
when examining the determinants of FDI within China.  They justify this interpretation by presuming that 
corruption levels are similar across provinces.  Obviously, one might question this claim.  Other examples include 
Wedeman (2005, 2008) which use the number of economic crime cases filed to measure the Party’s effort to 
strengthen enforcement of relevant laws and disciplines.  Here economic crime includes graft, bribery, 
misappropriation of public funds, etc.  
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No matter what the conviction rate exactly measures, we argue that use of newspaper 
counts provides for a more general proxy for anticorruption since convictions of government 
officials for corruption are likely to be reported in official newspapers.  An advantage of our 
proxy is that it is broader than convictions since anticorruption campaigns can also involve 
increasing public awareness as well as mobilizing public opinion.  The conviction rate does not 
directly include these facets.  Moreover, conviction of a high ranking official could signal a 
more intense anticorruption campaign than would a conviction of a low ranking official.  The 
conviction rate treats the two the same although our newspaper proxy can capture this distinction 
as long as convictions of high ranking officials receive more news coverage.  
 
[Insert Figure 5 Here] 
 
2.4. Is Our Anticorruption Proxy Just Another Corruption Proxy? 
 
If the Party fights corruption hardest in the most corrupt provinces then perhaps we are 
mainly re-inventing the wheel and merely constructing another measure of corruption.  If so, 
then any negative association between our proxies and growth as shown below could be just 
another finding that corruption hurts growth.  However, we believe that such a potential is small.  
For one, as we showed above anticorruption efforts as measured by our proxies do not seem to 
be targeted to those provinces with the most corruption.  Second, commonly used national 
measures of corruption such as the WGI’s Control of Corruption indicator evolve differently than 
do our newspaper count proxies.  Corruption in China seems to be more stable than the Party’s 
anticorruption efforts at the national level.  Finally, to the extent that the level of corruption also 
holds steady during our sample period at the provincial level, then the extent of corruption can be 
implicitly captured by including provincial fixed effects in the model which we will do.  
 
 
3. Anticorruption and Growth: Empirics 
This section examines to what extent the anticorruption efforts made by the Party have 
lowered economic growth.  Figure 6 provides initial evidence of a negative association where 
anticorruption is measured with our newspaper proxies discussed earlier in section 2.  Each dot 
denotes a province-year pairing.  This section will now undertake a more formal examination of 
the relationship.  Below we first describe the empirical methodology and then presents results.    
  
[Insert Figure 6 Here] 
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We consider the specification that consists of a fixed-effects panel model:   
  titititititi CXincometionanticorrupGrowth ,,1,2,10, lnln         (1)            
where i indexes 31 provinces and t indexes 14 years from 2000 to 2014. The dependent variable, 
growthi,t, is the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita of province i in year t. Anticorruptioni,t 
is approximated by the natural logs of the share of corruption-related articles in all articles, 
ln(corrupt/all)i,t, and in government-related articles, ln(corrupt/gov)i,t, respectively.  If the 
Party’s anticorruption efforts do hinder economic growth as suggested in Figure 6, α1 is expected 
to be negative and statistically significant.  We also include the logarithm of the previous year’s 
GDP per capita, ln incomei,t-1, to control for convergence across provinces. In addition, following 
the framework in Mankiw et al. (1992), Xi,t is a set of controls commonly used in the growth 
literature: province-level physical investment, population growth, technological progress, 
depreciation, average years of education (as a measure of human capital), and the share of 
private sector employment in total employment (as a measure of privatization). Lastly, ηi and λt 
are unobserved province- and year-specific fixed effects, respectively. The data of GDP per 
capita and other controls are gathered from China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2008, China 
Statistical Yearbook, and its counterpart at the provincial level for various years. 
Three potential concerns arise with the model in (1).  The first is that estimates made 
with annual data might be driven by short-run economic fluctuations.  To check the robustness 
of the results with longer time windows, we also estimate (1) by using three-year time 
intervals.22  Having only 15 years makes it difficult to consider longer windows.  Of course, 
using annual data remains appropriate if anticorruption campaigns have more immediate effects 
that contribute to short-run fluctuations.    
A second concern involves the validity of our anticorruption proxies.  Are they really 
measures of the intensity of anticorruption campaigns?  As an indirect test, we interact these 
proxies in (1) with the number of subscriptions to the Party’s official newspapers.  Presumably, 
any cost due to the disruptions or uncertainties of an anticorruption campaign should be more 
heavily felt where the government’s reach is most extensive.  The number of subscriptions can 
be used to measure this reach.  For one, the number of subscribers suggests how effectively and 
efficiently the Party’s policies, including but not limited to its anticorruption campaigns, can be 
implemented in a top-down manner in a province for a given year.  The literature has well 
documented that as an integral part of the Party’s propaganda system, the subscriptions of the 
Party’s organs, are overwhelmingly mandatory for all government agencies, state-owned 
                                                             
22 Considering the period 2000-2014, we have four data points for each province: 2013, 2010, 2007 and 2004. 
When t=2004, for example, t-1 is 2001, and income growth and anticorruption variables are averages in three-year 
spans. We do not use five-year averages due to the fact that the entire sample period is relatively short, especially 
when we deal with system and difference GMM estimates which will be discussed in section 4. For example, the 
difference GMM models cannot be estimated due to a lack of sufficient sample periods if we use five-year averages.  
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enterprises (SOEs), and even some private businesses and organizations (Huang, 2001; 
Shambaugh, 2007; Zhang, 2011).  Second, the greater number of subscriptions suggests a 
greater number of agencies that can be affected by anticorruption campaigns.  Unlike 
subscriptions of regular or commercial newspapers which depend upon income level, the 
subscriptions of the organs depend primarily upon the number of government agencies and SOEs.  
That is why such mandatory subscriptions have not experienced any substantial changes in most 
provinces over the sample period, except for the three direct-controlled municipalities, Beijing, 
Tianjin, and Shanghai where they all declined.  The model becomes: 
titititi
titititi
CXincome
tionanticorruponssubscriptitionanticorrupGrowth
,,1,3
,,2,10,
ln                  
lnln





       (2)       
where subscriptionsi,t denotes the number of subscriptions per thousand people of the Party’s 
official newspaper in province i in year t.  The data of subscriptions comes from China Press 
and Publishing Statistics for the years from 2000 to 2013.  Supposing that the Party’s 
anticorruption efforts measured by ln anticorruptioni,t have the greatest impact where the Party’s 
reach is most extensive, then α2 is expected to have the same sign as α1.   
The third concern regards endogeneity and will be discussed in the next section.   
Table 1 presents results of these two specifications.  The first four columns of Table 1 
display the estimates when using our first anticorruption measure, the logarithm of the ratio of 
corruption-related articles to all articles, and the last four columns display those when using our 
second anticorruption measure, the logarithm of the ratio of corruption-related articles to 
government-related ones. We report the results of the pooled models in 3-1 and 3-5 for 
comparison. All other models in the table include fixed-effects.   
All columns in Table 1 consistently suggest that anticorruption hurts growth.  The 
annual data in panel A show that when excluding the interaction term, the coefficient of our 
anticorruption measure is always negative and statistically significant no matter which 
anticorruption measure is used nor whether other controls are introduced.  In terms of 
magnitude, the models using the main anticorruption measure (corruption articles normalized by 
all articles) in columns 3-2 and 3-3 indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in this index is 
associated with a decrease in growth of 0.38 percentage points, or 0.13 standard deviations. The 
models using the second measure, 3-6 and 3-7 (normalized by government articles), indicate a 
relatively smaller effect, a decrease in the growth rate by around 0.21~0.23 percentage points.   
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
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The conclusions are confirmed by the three-year average data reported in panel B of the 
table.  In fact, the negative effect of anticorruption becomes about three times larger in 
magnitude and more statistically significant, either with or without the interaction term in the 
model. For instance, the estimate from model 3-3 using three-year averages indicates that a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the ratio of corruption-related articles to all articles is 
associated with a decrease in growth of 1.12 percentage points, three-times larger than the 
0.38-percentage-point decline estimated with annual data.  To further put this magnitude into 
context, consider the anticorruption indices from 2014.  If Heilongjiang with the smallest index 
value, 3.24%, had Shanxi’s value of 8.85%, then Heilongjiang’s growth would decrease by 
approximately 4 percentage points, or about 1.4 standard deviations, decreasing Heilongjiang’s 
growth from 5.6% to 1.6%.  Given that use of the three-year average data does not overturn the 
conclusions drawn on the basis of the annual data, we will concentrate on the annual data 
hereafter.  
Moreover, the coefficients on the interaction terms in 3-4 and 3-8 are negative and 
statistically significant, which implies again that anticorruption hurts growth no matter which 
anticorruption measure we use. As expected, such a negative effect becomes larger in a province 
with more subscriptions of the Party’s organs.  As stated, one explanation is that anticorruption 
policies could have greater effects where the party’s reach is more extensive.  According to the 
estimates of 3-4, an increase in subscriptions by one standard deviation, or 6.56 per thousand 
people, leads to a 31% increase in the growth-prohibiting effect of anticorruption with annual 
data and a 19% increase with three-year average data.  The effectiveness and efficiency of the 
Party’s propaganda system and policy implementation in general matters.  
 
4. Anticorruption and Growth: Endogeneity Concerns 
As well documented in the literature (see Manion, 2004; Quade, 2007; and Gong, 2011 
among others), the anticorruption campaigns in China usually take place in a top-down 
manner–when, where, and how hard to run an anticorruption campaign are decided by the 
Central Committee of the Party at the national level, rather than at the provincial level. For 
instance, the work report of Wang Qishan, Secretary of the CCDI, reveals that the Party sent 
anticorruption task forces to five provinces in 2013, suggesting that the campaign in these 
provinces were more intense than elsewhere.  As a result, it is unlikely for provincial leaders to 
initiate an anticorruption campaign to distract public attention or get promoted when they 
anticipate an economic slowdown in their province.  That is, the endogeneity issue should be 
less of a concern at the provincial level. 
One, however, could argue that perhaps the Central Committee of the Party deliberately 
chooses the provinces with slower economic growth to fight corruption harder in order to distract 
public attention to economic troubles.  A related possibility is that slower growing provinces 
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receive greater scrutiny, again leading to more intense anticorruption campaigns.  In addition, 
the Party could choose not to run anticorruption campaigns in more prosperous provinces or run 
them to a lesser extent because Party officials do not want to “rock the boat” in these provinces.  
If this were the case, the estimated relationship of interest even with fixed-effects models would 
have a bias toward finding a detrimental impact of anticorruption on growth.  To better address 
these concerns: we take two approaches.  We first consider dynamic-GMM estimation using 
lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments.  We then consider an external 
instrument.   
4.1 Dynamic GMM Estimation 
To employ the dynamic GMM techniques, we first replace the dependent variable in (1) 
with year-t income:      
tiititititi CXincometionanticorrupincome ,,1,2,10, lnlnln         (3) 
We then estimate (3) using the difference-GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) 
as well as the system-GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998).  The system and difference GMM techniques have been widely applied in the growth 
literature.  In the case of persistent explanatory variables, Bond et al. (2001) suggest that the 
first-differenced GMM estimator can produce biased coefficients since the lagged levels of these 
variables would serve as weak instruments.  Alternatively, the Blundell and Bond (1998) 
system GMM estimates equation (3) in both first differences and levels which obtains more 
moment conditions thereby increasing efficiency.23  See Blundell and Bond (1998), Hauk and 
Wacziarg (2009) and Roodman (2006) for further details.24  An advantage of these 
dynamic-GMM methodologies is also to address the lagged endogenous variable on the right 
hand side in (1) and (3).   
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
As for the estimates of the system and difference GMM models, we stress three points.  
First, the results are in line with those of the fixed-effects models that the Party’s anticorruption 
                                                             
23A critical assumption, however, of system-GMM is that the fixed effects are not correlated with changes in the 
endogenous variables.     
24 For these specifications, we use a Sargan test to examine whether these instruments are valid.  A key assumption 
is that ε is not serially correlated and so we also test the residual for first and second order serial correlation.  As 
shown below, the null hypothesis of valid instruments is not rejected, but the null hypothesis of no second order 
serial correlation is rejected in half of the specifications using the 5% significance level.  This is exactly why we 
will adopt an external instrument later in this section and even undertake an event study in the next section.  
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campaigns have a negative influence on growth.  Second, the coefficients of initial income are 
less than unity, which offers support to the convergence hypothesis.  Third, the estimated effects 
of other controls are consistent with those in the OLS models, except for that of the share of the 
private sector in total employment which is considered as a measure of institutional changes.  
The correlation between the private share of total employment and economic growth becomes 
positive and statistically significant at 1% in three of the four GMM estimations.  
Unfortunately, dynamic GMM methodologies are not panaceas to overcome endogeneity 
concerns.  For instance, using lags as instruments might not be appropriate in the presence of 
serially correlated errors and our diagnostic checks do raise concerns regarding the presence of 
second order serial correlation. Rajan and Arvind Subramanian (2008) discuss other concerns 
with these methodologies. Due to these concerns, we next consider an external instrument in an 
attempt to better identify the causal effect of anticorruption on growth.   
 
4.2 Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation 
We instrument for anticorruption using the ratio of articles containing the key phrase “中
央 (the central government or the Central Committee of the Party, in Chinese)” to all articles in 
the Party’s organ in each province.25  The instrumental variable gauges how frequently a 
provincial organ mentions decisions and policies of the central government, which we consider 
as a measure of a province’s loyalty to the central government or the Central Committee of the 
Party.  As a former chief editor in the Commentary Department of the PD, Wu (1994) points out 
that the rate at which the official newspapers reprint editorials and other articles of the PD is seen 
as indictors of the loyalty of provincial governments to the national government.  This is very 
much in line with what has been observed during the anticorruption campaigns.  Take the 
corruption scandal of Bo Xilai again as an example.  Right after Bo was removed from his post 
in March 2012, every provincial organ published at least one article the next month explicitly 
showing their support to the decision of the Central Committee of the Party.   
 
[Insert Figure 7 Here] 
 
For our instrument to be appropriate, it must be correlated with our anticorruption proxy 
but not correlated with the residual in (1).  Although provinces rarely launch their own 
anticorruption campaigns, a question still arises as to what extent they cooperate with directives 
from the central government.  Presumably, ones that are more likely to cooperate will more 
                                                             
25 With this IV estimation, we do not use our proxy normalized by the number of government-related articles 
because the key phrase in our instrument “central government” already contains the phrase “government. 
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often mention the central government’s role in these campaigns.  Thus, we expect a positive 
association between the instrumental variable and our anticorruption measure, which is 
confirmed by Figure 7.  Model 3-18 in Table 3 presents a more formal investigation, showing 
that a one standard deviation increase, or 33%, in loyalty measured by the frequency of 
central-government-related articles in the provincial organs is on average associated with a 0.55 
standard deviation, or 23%, increase in anticorruption measured by the frequency of 
corruption-related articles. Not only is the coefficient statistically significant, but the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F test rejects the hypothesis that loyalty is a weak instrument for 
anticorruption.   
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
A valid instrument also needs to satisfy an exclusion restriction that conditional on the 
controls in the model loyalty would not be associated with economic growth except for a direct 
effect of anticorruption.  Simply speaking, is the instrument plausibly exogenous?  To the best 
of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence in the literature which links the loyalty of a 
province to the central government of China to its economic performance.  This is probably 
because in contrast with its political system the Chinese economy often grew in a bottom-up 
manner in the past several decades.  Many studies, such as Zhu (2012) and Lardy (2014) among 
others, show that the private sector has already dominated in the economy in the 2000s in terms 
of output, employment, and productivity growth.  In fact, several coastal provinces, such as 
Guangdong, that grew much faster than other regions of the country have long been considered 
as “rule breakers” when they experimented new economic policies without permission of the 
central government in the 1990s.  
 Of course, one can still question the exogeneity of the instrument. As Durlauf et al. 
(2004) argue, growth theory continuously extends its boundary and now becomes so broad that it 
is always possible to find a theory suggesting that an instrument can affect growth other than 
through the endogenous variable.  Specific to our study, one might argue that a more loyal 
province could be given favorable consideration that boosts growth.  Therefore, these results 
should still be interpreted cautiously.       
 The second-stage and reduced-form estimations are reported in models 3-19 and 3-20 of 
Table 3.  The results of both models are consistent with the previous ones using the fixed effects 
and GMM models, namely anticorruption has a negative and statistically significant influence on 
economic growth. The magnitude of the harmful effect is also similar to that estimated with the 
fixed effects models.   
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 5. Event Study Analysis of the Sentencing of Provincial Officials 
The above sections purport to show that anticorruption campaigns have short run, 
negative effects upon economic growth.  To help support this conjecture we consider an 
alternative approach.  Instead of looking at the anticorruption efforts made by the Party and 
proxied by newspaper counts, we now consider specific outcomes of the Party’s anticorruption 
campaigns and their possible effects upon growth.  Over the years hundreds of thousands of 
government officials were removed from posts during the campaigns and later thrown into jail 
due to corruption charges.26  Although considering each case is impossible, we can investigate 
whether growth is lower during the year when a major political leader was convicted of 
corruption.  The major political leaders of a province include the secretary of a provincial party 
committee, vice secretaries, the governor, and vice governors.  According to the CCDI, the 
corruption cases involving these high-ranking government officials are often classified as “major” 
cases.  Such removals usually necessitate substantial effort of the Party as it can trigger many 
political fights and under-the-table deals.  The efforts can often be reflected by a surge of 
corruption-related articles in the Party’s organs because the Party needs to assure lower-ranking 
officials and the public that the corrupt figure deserves penalties and the Party wants to use these 
major cases to educate lower-ranking officials.  That is, the event study analysis is coherent 
with the newspaper counting strategy advanced earlier.  The only difference between the two is 
that we here focus now on these specific cases.  A major case could shock a provincial economy 
profoundly.  The Chinese government even took specific steps to offer economic assistance to 
Chongqing after the secretary of its party committee, Bo Xilai, was removed from his post in 
2012 because of his corruption scandal.27   
We consider the following fixed-effects model: 
  titititititi CXincomeDummyGrowth ,,1,2,10, ln                  (4)  
where Dummyi,t equals 1 if there is a major corruption case in province i in year t and 0 otherwise.   
A negative value for φ1 implies that the occurrences of these major corruption cases lowered 
growth.  To check the robustness of the results, we create another dummy which equals one 
only if the secretary of the provincial party committee or the governor is convicted of corruption 
and zero otherwise.  Owing to the dual structure of the Party and its government in the Chinese 
bureaucratic system, both the secretary and the governor are considered “first-in-command”.  
We further hypothesize that anticorruption hinders a provincial economy even more when its 
“first-in-command” is caught due to corruption charges because they are commonly believed to 
be more influential, both politically and economically, than their deputies.  Other variables and 
                                                             
26 For instance, the CCDI report shows that more than 100,000 people have indicted for corruption, mostly 
government officials, since the ongoing campaign was launched in 2013.   
27 On April 21, 2012. China worries stability of Chongqing after Bo Xilai was suspended, The Wall Street Journal 
(Chinese edition), retrieved from: http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20120421/bch083405.asp 
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their data are exactly the same as those in (1).  
 As before, endogeneity concerns arise to the extent that officials with poor economic 
records are more likely to be investigated and later sentenced.  However, we believe that the 
timing of sentencing helps to address these concerns.  In China, sentencing usually takes place 
about one to two years after an official is investigated by the CCDI and/or removed from his or 
her post.28  Therefore, we are examining growth after the onset of an investigation, making it 
less likely that the investigation is being triggered by lower growth.29  Of course, if growth 
shocks are persistent then past negative shocks could trigger both investigations and lower future 
growth, thereby causing a negative association between the two. To address such a possibility, 
we regressed the major case dummy on the previous year’s growth rate using a logistic model 
with provincial and yearly fixed effects. The coefficient on lagged growth was not significant, 
suggesting that no evidence arises that these sentences were being triggered by recent economic 
slowdowns.  (Results available upon request.)     
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
For the first dummy variable, we find 31 major corruption cases among the provinces 
between 2000 and 2014.30  We manually gather the details of the cases, including names of 
corrupt government officials, their posts, province, and sentence dates, from several news 
sources and CCDI reports.  In terms of the second dummy variable, there are 7 
first-in-commands from 7 different provinces who were convicted of corruption during the 
sample period.  The details of these cases are listed in Appendix II.   
                                                             
28 In China, if the CCDI announces its investigation toward a high-ranking government official, it usually means 
that the investigation has already been completed and the CCDI has already held solid evidence of his or her 
criminal behaviors. The announcements often suggest that the CCDI is ready to transfer the evidence to the People’s 
Procuratorate to be criminally prosecuted.  In most of the 31 cases we consider, sentencing takes places one to two 
years after the CCDI announces its investigation.     
29 In the text, we focus upon the sentencing date in creating our dummies. An alternative would be to focus upon the 
initial announcement of a CCDI investigation. The announcement usually comes out along with the Party’s decision 
of removing the official from his or her post.  We focus on sentencing for the following reasons.  First, the CCDI 
announced 25 investigations in 2014, the last year of our sample, but did not provide any details of these cases.  
Therefore, we are not sure whether these officials will be convicted of corruption or of other charges. Second, we 
cannot include these cases when examining lagged effects.  Third, as discussed in the text, since sentencing follows 
a year to two-year investigation it is less likely that the negative association between lower growth and sentencing is 
due to lower growth causing the sentencing.  Finally, the CCDI announced many of its investigations at the end of 
the year, making it unclear if these cases would have even affected growth during that same year.  Nevertheless, we 
still created analogous dummies based upon the CCDI announcement years.  Results were robust (and available 
upon request).    
30 The 31 major cases actually come from 20 provinces since 7 provinces have more than one major cases occurring 
over the sample period.  
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The results in Table 4 are consistent with our earlier findings.  Holding other controls 
constant, the growth rate of GDP per capita of a province declines on average by 0.7 percentage 
points during the year when sentencing occurs and by one percentage point when a 
first-in-command is convicted of corruption.  As expected, removing a first-in-command from 
his or her post generates a larger negative impact.  One can also consider how persistent these 
effects are.  Columns 3-23 and 3-26 include lags one through three of these respective dummies.  
The first two lags are significant but not the third (which is also much smaller in magnitude), 
suggesting that the detrimental impact of these convictions lasts about two years after sentencing.    
 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper presented a new approach for measuring the intensity of anticorruption efforts in 
China, namely by using the frequency of their inclusion, along with corruption more generally, in 
the Party’s official newspapers.  We also show how these proxies compare with other measures 
of corruption, both the commonly used indices such as those from the WGI and the conviction 
rate, as well as ones taken from newspaper counts.  And advantage of our measure is that it 
shows much greater intertemporal variation which is not surprising given that the intensity of 
anticorruption campaigns is likely to be less persistent than corruption itself.  A disadvantage of 
our approach is that it cannot be used more generally as not all countries have official news 
sources under such tight government control.     
Using our new anticorruption proxies, we find that the anticorruption campaigns run by 
the Party hinder economic growth in the short run.  Of course, such campaigns could raise 
growth in the long run if they are successful at lowering corruption.  Unfortunately, our short 
sample period does not allow us to examine long-run effects among these variables although one 
would also need time-varying, provincial measures of corruption.  Nevertheless, our approach 
suggests that such an examination will be warranted once more years of data become available 
and will be the subject of our future research.   
A second benefit of our approach is the creation of our anticorruption proxies which can 
be used by others in various research avenues.  To what extent are anticorruption campaigns 
accompanied by other policies?  What types of leaders are more prone to launch such 
campaigns?  Do certain types of events or trends more likely to trigger anticorruption efforts?  
How long do such campaigns usually last?  Do they have other effects on the economy other 
than growth effects?  Future work will address these and other questions.         
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Fig. 1. Evolution of Province-level Medians of Our Proxies 
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Fig. 2. Cross-provincial Fluctuations of the Party’s Anticorruption Efforts31 
 
                                                             
31 The map is made with china_map from http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/bocode/c. It’s based on the data of the ratio 
of corruption-related articles to all articles. For the coloring purpose, we try our best to evenly divide 31 provinces 
into four groups to avoid any arbitrary criterion of grouping.  The highest frequency group colored dark red has 
only 7 provinces and all other groups has 8.   
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Fig. 3. the WGI’s Control of Corruption and Our Main Proxy 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Ramirez’s Proxy and Our Proxy 
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Fig. 5. The Conviction Rate of Corruption and Our Main Proxy 
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Fig. 6. Anticorruption and Growth across 31 Provinces between 2000 and 2014 
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Fig. 7. Anticorruption and Loyalty across 31 Provinces between 2000 and 2014 
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Table 1: Baseline Results on Anticorruption and Growth 
 
 
 
Table 2: GMM Estimations on Anticorruption and Growth 
 
Regressor 3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5 3-6 3-7 3-8
Panel A: annual data 
Anticorruption #1: corrup/all (in logs) -2.049*** -0.957*** -0.844*** -0.538**
(0.673) (0.226) (0.266) (0.272)
Subscriptions × log anticorruption #1 -0.037*
(0.020)
Anticorruption #2: corrup/gov (in logs) -2.555*** -0.565** -0.500* -0.230
(0.509) (0.237) (0.262) (0.317)
Subscriptions × log anticorruption #2 -0.048*
(0.026)
Initial income (in logs) -0.964** -2.258* -0.295 -0.664 -1.108*** -1.990 -0.057 -0.063
(0.402) (2.391) (1.859) (2.275) (0.365) (2.395) (1.878) (2.343)
Physical investment (in logs) 1.285*** 0.697 1.295*** 0.707
(0.440) (0.701) (0.457) (0.714)
n  + g  + δ  (in logs) -2.356*** -2.426*** -2.354*** -2.427***
(0.377) (0.354) (0.399) (0.384)
Human capital 0.016 0.010 -0.039 -0.085
(0.463) (0.505) (0.478) (0.518)
Private share (in logs) -1.543* -1.500 -1.644* -1.519
(0.900) (1.108) (0.930) (1.146)
Costant 12.716*** 29.565 3.850 7.274 14.714*** 28.916** 3.683 3.563
(4.003) (24.057) (17.593) (21.102) (3.853) (23.901) (17.679) (21.989)
Adjusted R-square 0.139 0.621 0.706 0.698 0.180 0.615 0.702 0.692
No. of observations 437 437 434 392 437 437 434 392
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: three-year average data 
Anticorruption #1: corrup/all (in logs) -2.831*** -2.842*** -2.498*** -1.708***
(0.172) (0.877) (0.631) (0.412)
Subscriptions × log anticorruption #1 -0.061***
(0.013)
Anticorruption #2: corrup/gov (in logs) -2.717*** -1.952** -1.977*** -1.366**
(0.328) (0.934) (0.599) (0.668)
Subscriptions × log anticorruption #2 -0.079**
(0.032)
Adjusted R-square 0.344 0.683 0.745 0.721 0.319 0.654 0.727 0.735
No. of observations 124 124 124 120 124 124 124 120
Model
Notes: The dependent variable in the fixed-effects models is the growth rate of income. The robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, or *** 1 percent level. 
Regressor 3-9 3-10 3-11 3-12 3-13 3-14 3-15 3-16
Panel A: annual data 
Anticorruption #1: corrup/all (in logs) -0.034*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.020***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Anticorruption #2: corrup/gov (in logs) -0.037*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Initial income (in logs) 0.990*** 0.945*** 0.986*** 0.946*** 0.986*** 0.960*** 0.983*** 0.958***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.345)
Physical investment (in logs) 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.010* 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.090)
n  + g  + δ  (in logs) -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.026
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.064)
Human capital 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.121)
Private share (in logs) 0.163*** 0.153*** 0.108*** 0.102
(0.050) (0.061) (0.030) (1.248)
Costant 0.074* 0.553*** 0.140*** 0.572*** 0.159** 0.385*** 0.201*** 0.419
(0.040) (0.121) (0.041) (0.142) (0.065) (0.103) (0.066) (2.760)
No. of observations 411 409 411 409 379 375 379 375
Sargan test (p -value) 0.209 0.253 0.216 0.230 0.167 0.216 0.165 0.195
AR(1) z=-3.312*** z=-3.142*** z=-3.409*** z=-3.151*** z=-3.056*** z=-3.302*** z=-3.108*** z=-1.399
AR(2) z=-1.205 z=-3.100*** z=-1.658* z=-3.097*** z=-1.322 z=-2.863*** z=-1.658* z=-2.481**
Model
System GMM Difference GMM
Notes: The dependent variable in the system and difference GMM models is the level of income though they all examine the effect of anticorruption on growth. The robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, or *** 1 percent level. 
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Table 3: IV Estimation on Anticorruption and Growth 
 
 
 
Table 4: Event Study on Anticorruption and Growth 
 
IV estimations (xecond stage) Reduced form
Regressand Growth rate of GDP per capita Growth rate of GDP per capita
Regressor 3-17 3-18 3-19 3-20
Loyalty: central/all (in logs) 0.707*** 0.730*** -0.750*
(0.077) (0.074) (0.453)
Anticorruption #1: corrup/all (in logs) -1.068*
(0.594)
Initial income (in logs) -0.699*** -0.404 0.420
(0.188) (1.958) (1.819)
Physical investment (in logs) 0.033 1.292*** 1.232***
(0.075) (0.433) (0.466)
n  + g  + δ  (in logs) 0.028 -2.355*** -2.416***
(0.026) (0.372) (0.372)
Human capital 0.103 0.050 -0.041
(0.056) (0.456) (0.487)
Private share (in logs) 0.251 -1.483 -1.613*
(0.176) (0.907) (0.945)
Costant -2.345*** 3.964** 3.839 -1.313
(0.149) (1.724) (17.696) (16.506)
F -statistic on omitted variable 186.562
Adjusted R-square 0.656 0.668 0.706 0.702
No. of observations 437 434 434 435
Notes: The robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, or *** 1 percent 
level. 
IV estimations (First stage)
Anticorruption: corrup/all (in logs)
Model
Regressor 3-21 3-22 3-23 3-24 3-25 3-26
Dummy for major corrruption cases -0.986*** -0.694*** -1.104***
(0.266) (0.227) (0.368)
Dummy for major corrruption cases (1-year lag) -1.1084***
(0.301)
Dummy for major corrruption cases (2-year lag) -1.511***
(0.359)
Dummy for major corrruption cases (3-year lag) -0.752
(0.544)
Dummy for first-in-command corrruption cases -1.607*** -1.001*** -1.520**
(0.646) (0.408) (0.717)
Dummy for first-in-command corrruption cases (1-year lag) -1.592***
(0.486)
Dummy for first-in-command corrruption cases (2-year lag) -1.253***
(0.353)
Dummy for first-in-command corrruption cases (3-year lag) -0.603
(0.554)
Initial income (in logs) -1.595 1.592 -0.912 -1.727 1.334 -1.303
(2.021) (1.903) (2.218) (2.036) (1.926) (2.375)
Physical investment (in logs) 0.715 1.189 0.834 1.617
(0.597) (1.089) (0.592) (1.090)
n  + g  + δ  (in logs) -2.550*** -2.937*** -2.558*** -3.002***
(0.441) (0.471) (0.458) (0.526)
Human capital -0.469 -0.347 -0.444 -0.155
(0.544) (0.744) (0.541) (0.776)
Private share (in logs) -0.225 -1.533 -0.516 -2.493*
(1.134) (1.655) (1.126) (1.443)
Costant 26.535 -7.765 15.465 27.799 -5.531 17.306
(19.918) (16.922) (18.309) (20.063) (17.142) (20.061)
Adjusted R-square 0.605 0.682 0.670 0.603 0.681 0.649
No. of observations 465 431 339 465 431 339
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of income. The robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 
* 10 percent, ** 5 percent, or *** 1 percent level. 
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Appendix I: Summary Statistics of the Anticorruption Measures 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics I: Over Time Variation of Corruption/ALL Summary Statistics II: Over Time Variation of Corruption/Government
Year Mean Median S.D. Max. Min. Year Mean Median S.D. Max. Min.
2000 2.40% 2.49% 1.04% 4.60% 0.35% 2000 8.90% 9.04% 3.53% 14.47% 1.16%
2001 4.27% 3.74% 1.37% 7.32% 2.36% 2001 11.79% 11.21% 3.14% 18.05% 6.34%
2002 3.16% 2.71% 1.40% 6.17% 0.89% 2002 8.40% 7.89% 3.32% 16.13% 2.51%
2003 2.54% 2.44% 0.76% 4.46% 1.45% 2003 6.98% 6.54% 2.17% 11.33% 3.31%
2004 2.58% 2.70% 0.59% 3.65% 1.22% 2004 7.14% 7.26% 2.01% 11.90% 3.24%
2005 2.83% 2.55% 0.82% 4.90% 1.18% 2005 6.99% 6.64% 1.99% 12.28% 2.62%
2006 2.20% 2.29% 0.38% 2.79% 1.16% 2006 5.67% 5.66% 1.01% 7.38% 2.78%
2007 2.14% 2.10% 0.60% 3.60% 1.27% 2007 5.47% 5.32% 1.39% 9.26% 2.99%
2008 1.81% 1.85% 0.45% 2.87% 1.04% 2008 4.69% 4.89% 1.10% 7.60% 2.65%
2009 1.76% 1.77% 0.42% 2.85% 0.86% 2009 4.52% 4.64% 1.09% 7.01% 2.24%
2010 1.67% 1.60% 0.58% 3.83% 0.94% 2010 4.45% 4.32% 1.24% 7.86% 2.81%
2011 2.16% 2.09% 0.63% 3.70% 1.23% 2011 5.47% 5.50% 1.43% 8.61% 3.18%
2012 2.82% 2.86% 0.69% 4.37% 1.65% 2012 6.45% 6.49% 1.52% 9.20% 2.98%
2013 3.08% 2.99% 0.74% 4.99% 1.88% 2013 7.25% 7.44% 1.62% 11.85% 4.56%
2014 4.99% 4.87% 1.28% 8.85% 3.24% 2014 11.57% 11.10% 3.16% 22.45% 6.92%
Summary Statistics III: Cross-province Variation of Corruption/ALL Summary Statistics IV: Cross-province Variation of Corruption/Government
Province Mean Median S.D. Max. Min. Province Mean Median S.D. Max. Min.
Beijing 2.50% 2.29% 0.81% 3.91% 1.12% Beijing 7.55% 6.99% 2.36% 11.36% 4.78%
Tianjin 2.54% 2.02% 1.33% 5.80% 1.27% Tianjin 5.85% 5.68% 2.53% 12.03% 2.99%
Hebei 2.40% 2.53% 0.78% 3.85% 1.50% Hebei 7.93% 7.60% 2.50% 12.50% 5.05%
Shanxi 3.25% 2.78% 1.70% 8.85% 1.96% Shanxi 8.82% 7.60% 4.28% 22.45% 5.39%
Inner Mongolia 2.54% 2.28% 1.30% 5.77% 1.19% Inner Mongolia 6.73% 5.63% 3.40% 14.47% 3.72%
Liaoning 2.44% 2.44% 1.22% 4.85% 0.86% Liaoning 6.11% 5.21% 3.35% 13.54% 2.24%
Jilin 3.40% 2.80% 1.60% 6.89% 1.60% Jilin 8.52% 7.38% 3.59% 15.42% 4.08%
Heilongjiang 2.52% 2.12% 0.80% 4.01% 1.50% Heilongjiang 6.70% 5.98% 1.86% 9.96% 4.21%
Shanghai 2.41% 2.30% 0.94% 4.76% 1.00% Shanghai 6.90% 6.27% 2.54% 12.30% 3.52%
Jiangsu 2.50% 2.26% 1.13% 5.63% 0.98% Jiangsu 6.11% 5.88% 1.95% 11.09% 3.90%
Zhejiang 2.50% 2.57% 0.77% 4.15% 0.89% Zhejiang 6.30% 6.26% 1.81% 9.74% 2.51%
Anhui 2.89% 2.46% 1.12% 5.22% 1.32% Anhui 7.99% 6.70% 2.87% 13.67% 4.24%
Fujian 2.16% 1.95% 0.86% 4.20% 0.94% Fujian 6.47% 5.17% 3.08% 12.99% 2.93%
Jiangxi 3.04% 2.61% 1.49% 6.81% 1.38% Jiangxi 8.33% 7.61% 3.48% 18.23% 4.39%
Shandong 3.19% 2.52% 1.86% 7.83% 1.45% Shandong 7.51% 6.64% 3.85% 16.50% 3.83%
Henan 3.12% 2.83% 1.54% 6.40% 1.18% Henan 8.37% 7.89% 3.98% 18.05% 3.72%
Hubei 2.93% 2.99% 1.26% 5.26% 1.10% Hubei 8.33% 8.30% 3.04% 13.71% 3.79%
Hunan 3.15% 3.36% 1.24% 5.77% 1.60% Hunan 8.54% 7.89% 3.57% 17.65% 4.76%
Guangdong 3.50% 3.11% 1.22% 6.36% 1.96% Guangdong 7.28% 6.69% 2.09% 12.11% 4.92%
Guangxi 2.54% 2.33% 1.08% 5.10% 1.35% Guangxi 5.41% 4.97% 2.38% 10.88% 2.89%
Hainan 2.62% 2.30% 1.05% 5.58% 1.70% Hainan 6.56% 5.88% 1.94% 11.16% 4.43%
Chongqing 2.69% 2.43% 1.42% 7.32% 1.37% Chongqing 6.15% 5.49% 3.28% 17.16% 3.55%
Sichuan 1.92% 1.77% 0.80% 3.70% 0.89% Sichuan 5.06% 4.62% 1.99% 9.02% 2.51%
Guizhou 2.49% 2.34% 0.82% 3.87% 1.58% Guizhou 5.99% 5.73% 2.04% 9.70% 3.72%
Yunnan 2.05% 1.49% 1.21% 4.88% 0.35% Yunnan 4.98% 3.42% 2.92% 11.10% 1.16%
Tibet 2.54% 2.52% 0.78% 3.83% 1.57% Tibet 5.51% 5.39% 1.92% 9.05% 2.98%
Shaanxi 2.73% 2.46% 0.91% 4.90% 1.63% Shaanxi 6.98% 6.42% 2.48% 12.28% 4.27%
Gansu 2.72% 2.33% 1.23% 5.68% 1.47% Gansu 7.41% 6.50% 2.95% 13.64% 4.20%
Qinghai 2.51% 2.16% 1.26% 6.17% 1.06% Qinghai 6.85% 5.82% 3.25% 16.13% 3.07%
Ningxia 2.50% 2.02% 1.12% 5.48% 1.59% Ningxia 6.18% 5.46% 2.36% 12.56% 4.33%
Xinjiang 2.56% 2.40% 1.14% 5.42% 1.12% Xinjiang 6.76% 5.91% 3.32% 13.68% 3.21%
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Appendix II: Major Corruption Cases 
Year Province Official Post[a],[b] Sentence Charges[c],[d] 
2000 Jiangxi Hu, Changqing Vice gov. Death penalty Bribery of RMB 5.44  
2000 Zhejiang Xu, Yunhong Vice gov. 10 year imprisonment Power abuse and bribery 
2000 Guangxi Cheng, Kejie Gov. Death penalty Bribery of RMB 41  
2001 Liaoning Mu, Suixin Vice gov. Death penalty with reprieve Bribery of RMB 6.6  
2002 Fujian Shi, Zhaobin Vice sec. 13 year imprisonment Bribery of RMB 0.6  
2002 Chongqing Qin, Changdian  Vice gov. 1 year probation Bribery of $3,000 
2002 Guangxi Liu, Zhibing Vice gov. 15 year imprisonment Bribery of RMB 0.86  
2003 Hebei Cong, Fukui Vice gov. Death penalty with reprieve Bribery of RMB 9.36  
2003 Hebei Cheng, Weigao Secretary Disciplined within Party  Power abuse  
2003 Yunnan Li, Jiating Gov., vice sec. Death penalty with reprieve Bribery of RMB 18  
2004 Anhui Wang, Huaizhong Vice gov. Death penalty Bribery of RMB 5.17  
2004 Hubei Zhang, Guoguang Gov., vice sec. 11 year imprisonment Bribery of RMB 0.57  
2004 Guizhou Liu, Fangren Secretary Life imprisonment Bribery of RMB 6.77  
2004 Guizhou Liu, Changgui Vice gov. 11 year imprisonment Bribery of RMB 1.34  
2005 Liaoning Liu, Ketian Vice gov. 12 year imprisonment Bribery of RMB 1.31  
2005 Xinjiang Aman Haji Vice gov. 12 year imprisonment Bribery of RMB 8  
2006 Shanxi Hou, Wujie Vice sec. 11 year imprisonment Bribery of RMB 0.88  
2006 Sichuan Li, Dachang Vice gov. 7 year imprisonment Power abuse 
2007 Anhui Wang, Zhaoyao Vice sec. Death penalty with reprieve Bribery of RMB 7.04  
2007 Anhui He, Minxu Vice gov. Death penalty with reprieve Bribery of RMB 8.41  
2007 Guangdong Liu, Weiming Vice gov. Not publically released Power abuse, bribes 
2008 Shanghai Chen, Liangyu Secretary 18 year imprisonment Power abuse and bribery 
2008 Beijing Liu, Kehua Vice gov. Death penalty with reprieve Bribery of RMB 7  
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2008 Shandong Du, Shicheng Vice sec. Life imprisonment Bribery of RMB 6.26  
2009 Guangxi Sun, Yu Vice gov. 18 year imprisonment Bribery of RMB 3.28 
2011 Ningxia Li, Tangtang Vice gov Life imprisonment Bribery of RMB 7  
2012 Inn. Mongolia Liu, Zhuozhi Vice gov. Life imprisonment Bribery of RMB 8.17  
2012 Chongqing Wang, Lijun Vice gov. 15 year imprisonment Bribery of RMB 3.05  
2013 Jilin Tian, Xueren Vice gov. Life imprisonment Bribery of RMB 19.19  
2013 Chongqing Bo, Xilai Secretary Life imprisonment Bribery of RMB 21.79  
2013 Shandong Huang, Sheng Vice gov. Life imprisonment Bribery of RMB 12.23  
 Notes: [a] The post that the corrupt official was removed from or had held within three years before sentence; 
[b] Secretary and vice secretary stand for the secretary or vice secretary of the provincial committee of the Party,  
respectively;   
[c] For some cases the specific amount of RMB of bribery was not released on public media; 
[d] RMB values are in millions 
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